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Abstract. In this paper an adaptive decision model based on predictive loops 
through feeling states is analysed from the perspective of rationality. Four 
different variations of Hebbian learning are considered for different types of 
connections in the decision model. To assess the extent of rationality, a measure is 
introduced reflecting the environment’s behaviour. Simulation results and the 
extents of rationality of the different models over time are presented and analysed. 
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1    Introduction 
In decision making tasks different options are compared in order to make a reasonable 
choice out of them. Options usually have emotional responses associated to them 
relating to a prediction of a rewarding or aversive consequence. In decisions such an 
emotional valuing often plays an important role. In recent neurological literature this 
has been related to a notion of value as represented in the amygdala [1, 2, 14, 15, 17]. 
In making decisions experiences with the environment (from the past) play an 
important role. By learning processes the decision making mechanism is adapted to 
these experiences, so that the decision choices made are reasonable or in some way 
rational, given the enviroment reflected in these past experiences. In this sense the 
emotion-related valuing in the amygdala as a basis for decision making may be 
expected to satisfy some rationality criterion. The question to which extent this indeed 
is the case for certain biologically plausible learning models is the focus of this paper. 
The decision model considered involves predictive as-if body loops through feeling 
states in order to reach decisions for selections of actions (e.g., [3, 6, 8]). The type of 
learning considered is Hebbian learning (cf. [10, 12]), in four different variations by 
applying it to different types of connections in the decision model. To assess their 
extent of rationality, a rationality measure is introduced reflecting the environment’s 
behaviour. 
In this paper, in Section 2 the decision model and the different variants of 
adaptivity considered are introduced. Section 3 presents a number of simulation 
results. In Section 4 measures for rationality are discussed, and the different models 
are evaluated. Finally, Section 5 is a discussion. 
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2    The Adaptive Decision Models Addressed 
Traditionally an important function attributed to the amygdala concerns the context of 
fear. However, in recent years much evidence on the amygdala in humans has been 
collected showing a function beyond this fear context. In humans many parts of the 
prefrontal cortex (PFC) and other brain areas such as hippocampus, basal ganglia, and 
hypothalamus have extensive, often bidirectional connections with the amygdala [11, 
15, 18]. A role of amygdala activation has been found in various tasks involving 
emotional aspects [16]. Usually emotional responses are triggered by stimuli for 
which a prediction is possible of a rewarding or aversive consequence. Feeling these 
emotions represents a way of experiencing the value of such a prediction: to which 
extent it is positive or negative. This idea of value is also the basis of work on the 
neural basis of economic choice in neuroeconomics. In particular, in decision-making 
tasks where different options are compared, choices have been related to a notion of 
value as represented in the amygdala [1, 2, 14, 15, 17, 19]. 
Any mental state in a person induces emotions felt by this person, as described in 
[7, 8, 9]; e.g., [9], p. 93:  ‘… few if any exceptions of any object or event, actually 
present or recalled from memory, are ever neutral in emotional terms. Through either 
innate design or by learning, we react to most, perhaps all, objects with emotions, 
however weak, and subsequent feelings, however feeble.’ More specifically, in this 
paper it is assumed that responses in relation to a sensory representation state roughly 
proceed according to the following causal chain for a body loop (based on elements 
from [4, 7, 8]): 
 
sensory representation   →  preparation for bodily response  →  body state modification  →  
sensing body state  →  sensory representation of body state →  induced feeling 
 
In addition, an as-if body loop uses a direct causal relation 
 
preparation for bodily response  →  sensory representation of body state 
 
as a shortcut in the causal chain; cf. [7]. This can be considered a prediction of the 
action effect by internal simulation (e.g., [13]). The resulting induced feeling is a 
valuation of this prediction. If the level of the feeling (which is assumed positive) is 
high, a positive valuation is obtained. 
The body loop (or as-if body loop) is extended to a recursive (as-if) body loop by 
assuming that the preparation of the bodily response is also affected by the level of 
the induced feeling:  
 
induced feeling  →  preparation for  the bodily response   
 
Such recursion is suggested in [8], pp. 91-92, noticing that what is felt is a body state 
which is under control of the person: ‘The brain has a direct means to respond to the 
object as feelings unfold because the object at the origin is inside the body, rather than 
external to it. The brain can act directly on the very object it perceives. (…) The 
object at the origin on the one hand, and the brain map of that object on the other, can 
influence each other in a sort of reverberative process that is not to be found, for 
example, in the perception of an external object.’ In this way the valuation of the 
prediction affects the preparation. A high valuation will strengthen activation of the 
preparation. 
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Informally described theories in scientific disciplines, for example, in biological or 
neurological contexts, often are formulated in terms of causal relationships or in terms 
of dynamical systems. To adequately formalise such a theory the hybrid dynamic 
modelling language LEADSTO has been developed that subsumes qualitative and 
quantitative causal relationships, and dynamical systems; cf. [4]. This language has 
been proven successful in a number of contexts, varying from biochemical processes 
that make up the dynamics of cell behaviour to neurological and cognitive processes; 
e.g. [4, 5]. Within LEADSTO a dynamic property or temporal relation a → D b denotes 
that when a state property a occurs, then after a certain time delay (which for each 
relation instance can be specified as any positive real number D), state property b will 
occur. Below, this D is the time step Δt. A dedicated software environment is 
available to support specification and simulation. A specification of the model in 
LEADSTO format can be found in Appendix A. 
An overview of the basic decision model involving the generation of emotional 
responses and feelings is depicted in Fig. 1. This picture also shows representations 
from the detailed specifications explained below. However, note that the precise 
numerical relations are not expressed in this picture, but in the detailed specifications 
below, through local properties LP0 to LP6. 
 
Fig. 1. Overview of the model for decision making evaluated from a rationality perspective 
Note that the effector state for bi combined with the (stochastic) effectiveness of 
executing bi in the world (indicated by effectiveness rate λi between 0 and 1) activates 
the sensor state for bi via body loop as described above. By a recursive as-if body loop 
each of the preparations for bi generates a level of feeling for bi which is considered a 
valuation of the prediction of the action effect by internal simulation. This in turn 
affects the level of the related action preparation for bi. Dynamic interaction within 
these loops results in equilibrium for the strength of the preparation and of the feeling, 
and depending on these values, the action is actually activated with a certain intensity. 
The specific strengths of the connections from the sensory representation to the 
preparations, and within the recursive as-if body loops can be innate, or are acquired 
during lifetime. The computational model is based on such neurological notions as 
valuing in relation to feeling, body loop and as-if body loop. The adaptivity in the 
srs(bi) feeling(bi)
sensor_state(w)
sensor_state(bi)
world_state(w) srs(w) prep_state(bi) effector_state(bi)ω1i
ω2i
ω3i
λi
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model is based on Hebbian learning. The detailed specification of the model is 
presented below starting with how the world state is sensed. 
 
LP0  Sensing a World State 
If         world state property w occurs of level V1 
    and  the sensor state for w occurs has level V2 
then      the sensor state for w will have level V2 + γ [V1 – V2] Δt. 
 
ௗݏ݁݊ݏ݋ݎ_ݏݐܽݐ݁(ݓ) 
ௗݐ  = γ [world_state(w)  - sensor_state(w)]  (1) 
 
From the sensor state, sensory representation is updated by dynamic property LP1. 
 
LP1  Generating a Sensory Representation for a Sensed World State 
If        the sensor state for world state property w has level V1,  
    and the sensory representation for w has level V2 
then    the sensory representation for w will have level V2 + γ [V1 – V2] Δt. 
 
ௗ௦௥௦(௪) 
ௗ௧  = γ [sensor_state(w)  - srs(w)] (2) 
 
The combination function h to combine two inputs which activate a subsequent state 
uses the threshold function th thus keeping the resultant value in the range [0, 1] : 
 
th(σ, τ, V) = ቀ ଵଵା௘ష഑(ೇషഓ) െ
ଵ
ଵା௘഑ഓቁ כ (1 + ݁ିఙఛ) (3) 
 
where σ is the steepness and τ is the threshold value. The combination function is: 
 
h(σ, τ, V1, V2, ω1, ω2) =  th (σ, τ, ω1V1 + ω2V2) (4) 
 
where V1 and V2 are the current activation level of the states and ω1 and ω2 are the 
connection strength of the links from these states. 
Dynamic property LP2 describes the update of the preparation state for bi from the 
sensory representation of w and feeling of bi. 
 
LP2  From Sensory Representation and Feeling to Preparation of a Body State 
If           a sensory representation for w with level V occurs  
    and   the feeling associated with body state bi has level Vi 
    and   the preparation state for bi has level Ui 
     and   ω1i is the strength of the connection from sensory representation for w to preparation for bi 
     and   ω2i is the strength of the connection from feeling of bi to preparation for bi 
     and    σi    is the steepness value for preparation of bi and  τi    is the threshold value for preparation of bi 
     and    γ1    is the person’s flexibility for bodily responses 
then       after Δt  the preparation state for body state bi will have level Ui + γ1 [h(σi, τi, V, Vi, ω1i, ω2i ) - Ui] Δt. 
 
ௗ݌ݎ݁݌ܽݎܽݐ݅݋݊(ܾ݅) 
ௗݐ  = γ [ h(σi, τi, srs(w), feeling(bi), ω1i, ω2i)  - preparation(bi) ] (5) 
 
Dynamic property LP3 describes the update of the sensory representation of a body 
state from the respective preparation state and sensor state. 
 
LP3  From Preparation and Sensor State to Sensory Representation of a Body 
State 
If     preparation state for bi has level Xi 
and sensor state for bi has level Vi 
and  the sensory representation for body state bi has level Ui 
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and  ω3i is the strength of the connection from preparation state for bi to sensory representation for bi 
and  σi     is the steepness value for sensory representation of bi 
and  τi     is the threshold value for sensory representation of bi 
and  γ2    is the person’s flexibility for bodily responses 
then     after Δt  the sensory representation for bi will have level Ui + γ2 [ h(σi, τi, Xi, Vi, ω3i, 1)- Ui ] Δt. 
 
ௗݏݎݏ(ܾ݅)
ௗݐ  = γ [ h(σi, τi, preparation(bi), sensor_state(bi), ω3, 1) - srs(bi) ] (6) 
 
Dynamic property LP4 describes update of feeling bi from the sensory representation. 
 
LP4 From Sensory Representation of a Body State to Feeling 
If   the sensory representation for body state bi has level V1,  
and bi is felt with level V2 
then  bi will be felt with level V2 + γ [V1 – V2] Δt). 
 
ௗ݂݈݁݁݅݊݃(ܾ݅)
ௗݐ  = γ [srs(bi) - feeling(bi)] (7) 
 
LP5 describes how the effector state for bi is updated from the preparation state. 
 
LP5 From Preparation to Effector State 
If   the preparation state for bi has level V1,  
and the effector state for body state bi has level V2. 
then   the effector state for body state bi will have level V2 + γ [V1 – V2] Δt. 
 
ௗ݂݂݁݁ܿݐ݋ݎ_ݏݐܽݐ݁(ܾ݅) 
ௗݐ  = γ [preparation_state(bi) - effector_state(bi)] (8) 
 
LP6 describes update of the sensor state for bi from the effector state for bi. 
 
LP6  From Effector State to Sensor State of a Body State 
If   the effector state for bi has level V1,  
and λi is world preference/ recommendation for the option bi 
and  the sensor state for body state bi has level V2,  
then   the sensor state for bi will have level  V2 + γ [λi V1 – V2] Δt 
 
ௗݏ݁݊ݏ݋ݎ_ݏݐܽݐ݁(ܾ݅) 
ௗݐ  = γ [λi effector_state(bi) - sensor_state(bi)] (9) 
 
For the considered case study it was assumed that three options are available to the 
agent and the objective is to see how rationally an agent makes its decisions using a 
given adaptive model: under constant as well as in stochastic world characteristics 
and in both cases static as well as changing worlds. The dynamic properties LP7 to 
LP9 describe a Hebbian learning mechanism for the connection strengths  
(A) from sensory representation for w to preparation for option bi  
(B) from feeling bi to preparation for bi 
(C) from preparation for bi to sensory representation of bi 
These have been explored separately (A), (B), or (C), and in combination (ABC). 
 
LP7 Hebbian Learning (A): Connection from Sensory Representation of w to 
Preparation of bi 
If   the connection from sensory representation of w to preparation of bi has strength ω1i 
and the sensory representation for w has level V
 
 
and  the preparation of bi has level Vi  
and  the learning rate from sensory representation of w to preparation of bi is η 
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and  the extinction rate from sensory representation of w to preparation of bi is ζ 
then     after Δt  the connection from sensory representation of w to preparation of bi will have  
 strength ω1i + (ηVVi (1 - ω1i) - ζω1i) Δt. 
 
ௗ1݅
ௗݐ  = ηsrs(w)preparation(bi) (1 - ω1i) - ζω1i (10) 
 
LP8  Hebbian Learning (B): Connection from Feeling bi to Preparation of bi 
If   the connection from feeling associated with body state bi to preparation of bi has strength ω2i 
and the feeling for bi has level Vi  
and  the preparation of bi has level Ui  
and  the learning rate from feeling of bi to preparation of bi is η 
and  the extinction rate from feeling of bi to preparation of bi is ζ 
then     after Δt  the connection from feeling of bi to preparation of bi will have  
 strength ω2i + (ηViUi (1 - ω2i) - ζω2i) Δt. 
ௗ2݅
ௗݐ  = η feeling(bi)preparation(bi) (1 - ω2i) - ζω2i (11) 
LP9 Hebbian Learning (C): Connection from Preparation of bi to Sensory 
Representation of bi 
If   the connection from preparation of bi to sensory representation of bi has strength ω3i 
and the preparation of bi has level Vi    and  the sensory representation of bi has level Ui  
and  the learning rate from preparation of bi to sensory representation of bi is η 
and  the extinction rate from preparation of bi to sensory representation of bi is ζ 
then   after Δt  the connection from preparation of bi to sensory representation of bi will have 
 strength ω3i + (ηViUi (1 - ω3i) - ζω3i) Δt. 
 
ௗ3݅
ௗݐ  = η preparation(bi) srs(bi) (1 - ω3i) - ζω3i (12) 
3   Simulation Results 
In this section some of the simulation results, performed using numerical software, 
are described in detail. The simulation results address different scenarios reflecting 
different types of world characteristics, from constant to stochastic world, and from 
static to changing world. Moreover, learning the connections was done one at a time 
(A), (B), (C), and learning multiple connections simultaneously (ABC). Due to space 
limitation the graphs for only (A) are shown here. A summary of the results is given 
in Table 1. Results for the rationality factors are presented in the next section. For all 
simulation results shown, time is on the horizontal axis whereas the vertical axis 
shows the activation level of the different states. Step size for all simulations is ∆t = 1. 
Fig. 2 shows simulation results for the model under constant, static world 
characteristics: λ1 = 0.9, λ2 = 0.2, and λ3 = 0.1 . Other parameters are set as: learning 
rate η = 0.04, extinction rate ζ = 0.0015, initial connection strength ω2i= ω3i= 0.8, 
speed factors γ = 1, γ1 = 0.5, γ2 = 1, steepness σ = 2 and threshold τ = 1.2 for 
preparation state, and σ = 10 and τ = 0.3 for sensory representation of bi. For initial 
80 time units the stimulus w is kept 1 and for next 170 time units it is kept 0 and same 
sequence of activation and deactivation for stimulus is repeated for rest of simulation. 
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Fig. 2. Constant World:  (a) Connection strengths (A)  (b) Effector States for bi 
Initial values ω11= ω12= ω13= 0.5; η= 0.04,  ζ= 0.0015      
Moreover it depicts the situation in which only one type of links (ω1i) is learned as 
specified in LP7 using the Hebbian approach (A) for the connection from sensory 
representation of w to preparation state for bi. It is shown that the model adapts the 
connection strengths of the links ω1i according to the world characteristics given by λi. 
So ω11 strengthens more and more over time, resulting in the higher activation level 
of the effector state for b1 compared to the activation level of the effector states for the 
other two options b2 and b3. 
Similar experiments were carried out for a stochastic world with four different 
cases as mentioned earlier. To simulate the stochastic world, probability distribution 
functions (PDF) were defined for λi according to a Normal Distribution. Using these 
PDFs, the random numbers were generated for λi limiting the values for the interval 
[0, 1] with μ1=0.9, μ2=0.2 and μ3=0.1 for λi respectively. Furthermore the standard 
deviation for all λi was taken 0.1. Fig. 3 shows the world state w and stochastic world 
characteristics λi. Fig. 4 shows the simulation results while learning is performed for 
the links (A) from sensory representation of w to preparation state for bi.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Stochastic World 
It can be seen from these results that also in a stochastic scenario the agent model 
successfully learnt the connections and adapted to the world characteristics rationally 
with results quite similar to the results for a static world. 
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Fig. 4. Stochastic World: (a) Connection strengths (A)  (b) Effector States  
Initial values ω11= ω12= ω13= 0.5; η= 0.04, ζ= 0.0015     
Another scenario was explored in which the (stochastic) world characteristics were 
changing drastically from μ1=0.9, μ2=0.2 and μ3=0.1 for λi respectively to μ1=0.1, 
μ2=0.2 and μ3=0.9 for λi respectively with standard deviation of 0.1 for all. Fig. 5 and 
Fig. 6 show the results for such a scenario. The results show that the agent has 
successfully adapted to the changing world characteristics over time. The initial 
settings in this experiment were taken from the previous simulation results shown in 
Figs. 3 and 4 to keep the continuity of the experiment. It can be observed that the 
connection strength for option 3 becomes higher compared to the other options, and 
consequently the value of the effector state for b3 becomes higher than for the other 
two by the end of experiment. 
 
 
Fig. 5. World State 
 
 
Fig. 6. Changing World: (a) Connection strengths (A)   (b) Effector States  
Initial values ω11=0.78, ω12= 0.53, ω13= 0.52;  η= 0.04,ζ= 0.0015  
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Table 1. Overview of the simulation results for all links (A), (B), (C) and (ABC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar results were observed for all other cases (B), (C), and (ABC) as 
summarised in Table 1. Note that the table contains the values of different connection 
strengths and the activation level of effector states after the completion of simulation 
experiments. This shows a rational behavior of the agent in this particular scenario. 
4   Evaluating Agent Models on Rationality 
In the previous section it was shown that the agent model behaves rationally in 
different scenarios. These scenarios and its different cases are elaborated in detail in 
the previous section, but the results were assessed with respect to their rationality in a 
qualitative and rather informal manner. For example, no attempt was made to assign 
an extent or level to the rationality observed during these experiments. The current 
section addresses this and to this end two different formally defined measures to 
assess the extent of the rationality are introduced; one rationality measure is based on 
a discrete scale and the other one on a continuous scale.  
 
Method 1 (Discrete Rationality Measure) 
The first method presented is based on the following point of departure: an agent 
which has the same respective order of effector state activation levels for the different 
options compared to the order of world characteristics λi will be considered highly 
rational. So in this method the rank of the average value λi at any given time unit is 
Link Scenario ωx1 ωx2 ωx3 ES1 ES2 ES3
S tatic 0.78 0.53 0.52 0.56 0.15 0.14
S tocastic 0.78 0.53 0.52 0.56 0.15 0.14
Change 
World 0.40 0.38 0.80 0.09 0.09 0.58
S tatic 0.89 0.58 0.46 0.65 0.38 0.31
S tochastic 0.89 0.59 0.47 0.65 0.39 0.32
Change 
World 0.42 0.57 0.89 0.30 0.37 0.65
S tatic 0.88 0.29 0.23 0.63 0.28 0.26
S tochastic 0.88 0.29 0.23 0.63 0.28 0.27
Change 
World 0.04 0.08 0.87 0.25 0.26 0.63
0.81 0.55 0.54
0.85 0.30 0.29
0.85 0.30 0.29
0.80 0.55 0.54
0.84 0.30 0.29
0.84 0.30 0.29
0.64 0.64 0.94
0.02 0.03 0.96
0.02 0.03 0.96
A
0.13
S tocastic 0.57 0.13 0.13
Changed 
World 0.16 0.16 0.75
B
C
ABC
S tatic 0.59 0.13
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determined, and compared with the rank of the respective effector state levels. More 
specifically, the following formula is used to determine the irrationality factor IF.  
 
ܫܨ ൌ ෍ ܾܽݏ(ݎܽ݊݇(݁ݏ݅) െ ݎܽ݊݇(ߣ݅))
௡
௜ୀଵ
 
(13) 
 
where n is the number of options available. This irrationality factor tells to which 
extent the agent is behaving rationally in the sense that the higher the irrationality 
factor IF is, the lower is the rationality of the agent. It is assumed that the there is 
uniqueness in ranking and none of the two values assign a similar rank. To calculate 
the discrete rationality factor DRF, the maximum possible irrationality factor Max. IF 
can be determined as follows. 
 
Max. IF  =  ݊(݊+1)2 െ ݈ܿ݁݅݅݊݃(݊2) (14) 
 
Here ceiling(x) is the first integer higher than x. Note that Max. IF  is approximately 
½n2. As a higher IF means lower rationality, the discrete rationality factor DRF is 
calculated as: 
 
DRF  = 1 - ܫܨܯܽݔ. ܫܨ (15) 
 
On this scale, for each n only a limited number of values are possible; for example, 
for n = 3 three values are possible: 0, 0.5, and 1. In general ½ Max. IF  +1 values are 
possible, which is approximately ¼n2 + 1. As an example, suppose during a 
simulation average values of λ1= 0.107636, λ2 = 0.203044, and λ3 = 0.888522 are 
given, whereas the effector state values are ES1=0.170554, ES2= 0.12367 and ES3 = 
0.43477 at a given time point. So according to the given data the world’s ranks will be 
3, 2, 1 for λ1, λ2, λ3 and the agent’s ranks 2, 3, 1 for ES1, ES2, ES3 respectively. So 
according to the given formulas IF= 2, Max. IF = 4 and DRF = 0.5. So in this 
particular case at this given time point the agent is behaving rationally for 50%. 
 
Method 2 (Continuous Rationality Measure)  
The second method presented is based on the following point of departure: an agent 
which receives the maximum benefit will be the highly rational agent. This is only 
possible if ESi is 1 for the option whose λi is the highest. In this method to calculate 
the continuous rationality factor CRF, first to account for the effort spent in 
performing actions, the effector state values ESi  are normalised as follows. 
 
nESi = ாௌ௜∑ ாௌ௜೙೔సభ  (16) 
 
Here n is number of options available. Based on this the continuous rationality factor 
CRF is determined as follows, with Max(λi) the maximal value of the different λi. 
 
CRF  =  ∑ ௡ாௌ௜ ఒ௜
೙೔సభ
ெ௔௫(ఒ௜)
 
(17) 
 
This method enables to measure to which extent the agent is behaving rationally in a 
continuous manner. For the given example used to illustrate the previous method 
CRF= 0.6633. So according to this method the agent is considered to behaving for 
66.33% rationally in the given world.  
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Fig. 7. Rationality during learning ω1i (A)  Fig. 8. Rationality during learning ω2i (B) 
 
 
 Fig. 9. Rationality during learning ω3i (C)   Fig. 10. Rationality for learning ω1i, ω2i, ω3i (ABC) 
 
Fig. 7 to Fig. 10 show the two types of rationality (depicted as percentages) of the 
agent for the different scenarios with changing stochastic world. In these figures the  
first 250 time points show the rationality achieved by the agent just before changing 
world characteristics drastically for the simulations shown from Fig. 4. From time 
point 250 onwards, it shows the rationality of the agent after the change has been 
made (see Fig. 6). It is clear from the  results (Fig. 7 to Fig. 10) that the rationality 
factor of the agent in all four cases improves over time for the given world. 
5   Discussion 
This paper focused on how the extent of rationality of an adaptive decision model can 
be analysed. In particular, this was explored for variants of a decision model based on 
valuing of predictions involving feeling states generated in the amygdala; e.g., [1, 2, 6, 
8, 14, 15, 17]. The adaptation was based on using four different variations of Hebbian 
learning; cf. [10, 12].  
To assess the extent of rationality with respect to given world characteristics, two 
measures were introduced, and using these extents of rationality of the different 
models over time were analysed. It was shown how by the learning processes indeed a 
high level of rationality was obtained, and how after a major world change after some 
delay this rationality level is re-obtained. It turned out that emotion-related valuing of 
predictions in the amygdala as a basis for adaptive decision making according to 
Hebbian learning satisfies reasonable rationality measures.  
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Appendix A  Model Specifications in LEADSTO Format 
 
 
LP0  Sensing a world state
world_state(w, V1) & sensor_state(w, V2)  ? sensor_state(w, V2 + ? [V1 – V2] ?t)
LP1  Generating a sensory representation for a sensed world state
sensor_state(w, V1) &  srs(w, V2) ? srs(w, V2 + ? [V1 – V2] ?t)
LP2  From sensory representation and feeling to preparation of a body state
srs(w, V)  &  feeling(bi, Vi)  &  preparation_state(bi, Ui) &  
has_connection_strength(srs(w), preparation(bi), ?1i)  &  
has_connection_strength(feeling(bi), preparation(bi), ?2i)  & 
has_steepness(prep_state(bi), σi) & has_threshold(prep_state(bi), τi)
? preparation(bi, Ui + ?1 (h(σi, τi, V, Vi, ?1i, ?2i) - Ui) ?t)
LP3  From preparation  and sensor state to sensory representation of a body state
preparation_state (bi, Xi)  &  sensor_state(bi, Vi)  &  srs (bi, Ui) & 
has_connection_strength(preparation(bi), srs(bi), ?3i)  &  has_steepness(srs(bi), σi) &
has_threshold(srs(bi), τi)  ? srs(bi, Ui + ?2 (h(σi, τi, Xi, Vi, ?3i, 1) - Ui) ?t)
LP4 From sensory representation of a body state to feeling
srs(bi, V1)  & feeling(bi, V2) ? feeling(bi, V2 + ? [V1 – V2] ?t)
LP5 From preparation to effector state
preparation_state(bi, V) & effector_state(bi, V2) ? effector_state(bi, V2 + ? [V1 – V2] ?t))
LP6  From effector state to sensor state of a body state
effector_state(bi,V1) & effectiveness_rate(bi, λi) & sensor_state(bi,V2)
? sensor_state(bi, V2 + ? [λi V1 – V2] ?t)
LP7 Hebbian learning (A): connection from sensory representation of w to preparation of bi
has_connection_strength(srs(w), preparation(bi), ?1i) &  srs(w, V)  &  preparation(bi, Vi)  &  
has_learning_rate(srs(w), preparation(bi), ?)  &   has_extinction_rate(srs(w), preparation(bi), ?)
?   has_connection_strength( w, bi, ?1i + (?VVi (1 - ?1i) - ??1i) ?t)
LP8  Hebbian learning (B): connection from feeling bi to preparation of bi
has_connection_strength(feeling(bi), preparation(bi), ?2i) &  feeling(bi, Vi)  &  preparation(bi, Ui)  &  
has_learning_rate(feeling(bi), preparation(bi), ?)  &  has_extinction_rate(feeling(bi), preparation(bi), ?)
?   has_connection_strength(feeling(bi), preparation(bi), ?2i + (?ViUi (1 - ?2i) - ??2i) ?t)
LP9 Hebbian learning (C): connection from preparation of bi to sensory representation of bi
has_connection_strength(preparation (bi), srs(bi), ?3i) &  preparation (bi, Vi)  &  srs(bi, Ui)  &  
has_learning_rate(preparation (bi), srs(bi), ?)  &   has_extinction_rate(preparation (bi), srs(bi), ?)
?   has_connection_strength(preparation (bi), srs(bi), ?3i + (?ViUi (1 - ?3i) - ??3i) ?t)
